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Abstract 
We study the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity when employing different econometric 
methods in the estimation of two major value-relevance models: the Price Regression Model (PRM) 
and the Return Regression Model (RRM). Leveraging a large panel data set of European listed 
companies, we first demonstrate that robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
tests are of fundamental importance to choose correctly among a fixed-effects model, a random-
effects model, or a pooled OLS model. Second, we provide evidence that replacing firm fixed-effects 
with country and industry fixed-effects can lead to large differences in the magnitude of the key 
coefficients, with serious consequences for the interpretation of the effect of changes in earnings and 
book values per share on firm value. Finally, we offer recommendations to applied researchers aiming 
to improve the robustness of their econometric strategy. 
Keywords: Value-Relevance; Linear Information Model; IFRS; Price Regression Model; Return 
Regression Model; Panel Data. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate whether unobserved heterogeneity can lead to misspecifications in the estimation 
of value-relevance models. This is an important topic in other related fields such as asset pricing and 
corporate finance, as recently documented by Gormley and Matsa (2014). However, the value-
relevance accounting literature has hitherto only partially investigated this issue.  
Value-relevance studies aim to assess the extent to which accounting data reflect information that 
is “relevant” for firm value as represented by the stock price (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Over the 
last decades, a substantial amount of accounting studies have focused on the value relevance effects 
around the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards, henceforth IFRS (Callao et 
al., 2007; Zeff, 2007; Aharony et al., 2010; Devalle et al., 2010; Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Barth et 
al., 2012; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2014; Christensen et al., 2015).  
The motivation of our study lies in the heterogeneity of the approaches employed in the empirical 
literature, which hinders the comparability of findings for different countries (ICAEW, 2014). To 
address this issue and to answer calls for more robust econometric analysis in accounting research 
(Brüggemann et al, 2013), we investigate the impact of using different approaches on the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the coefficients of regression models typically employed in value 
relevance studies.  
The validity of the coefficient estimates of value-relevance models is a key topic in the value-
relevance literature (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Aboody et al., 2002). 
However, the existing literature does not provide clear guidelines to applied researchers on how to 
choose among different types of econometric approaches. It is also unclear whether choosing an 
inappropriate model may lead to wrong inferences with respect to whether a certain accounting 
variable is value relevant or not. This is the focus of our study. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we demonstrate the importance of employing 
the Hausman test (in its robust version, as developed by Arellano, 1993, and Wooldridge, 2002, and 
4 
 
2010) to decide whether a Fixed Effects (FE) model or a Random Effects (RE) model should be used. 
While some papers have used the Hausman test to select the correct model between FE and RE model 
(for example, Worthington and West, 2004), they tend not to use the “robust” Hausman test, and in 
most cases (for example, Devalle et al., 2010) neither version of the Hausman test is employed. For 
cases where the RE model is valid, we point out that the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test should be run to choose between the OLS model and the RE model. Using these tests is important 
to ensure that the estimator chosen is consistent and efficient. In particular, choosing the FE model 
when the RE model should be preferred may lead to insignificant coefficients, because the RE model 
is more efficient than the FE model. This is a crucial issue for researchers interested in value 
relevance analysis because an insignificant coefficient indicates that a variable is not value relevant.   
Second, we investigate the differential impact of firm FE, year FE, country FE, and industry FE. 
A recent study by Amir et al. (2016) points out that many empirical accounting researchers tend to 
(incorrectly) replace firm FE with other forms of FE, in particular industry FE. Amir et al. (2016) 
address this issue only for U.S. listed firms (which prepare their financial statements according to the 
U.S. GAAP), and they do not focus on value relevance models. We extend their findings in three 
ways: i) we examine value relevance models; ii) we use data for European listed firms for the period 
of compulsory IFRS adoption (2005 onwards); and iii) we examine the impact of the length of the 
sample period on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE using Monte Carlo simulations.  
Third, we examine whether using different levels of clustering the standard errors leads to 
substantially different results, and we check for the potential impact of attrition. We provide evidence 
that clustering the standard errors matters, and we emphasise the impact of using a small number of 
clusters on the extent of the bias. Attrition bias may also affect the coefficient estimates and overall 
explanatory power of the model, and this problem is likely to be more acute for sample periods 
including the 2008-2009 crisis. 
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The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample composition 
and data. Section 3 examines the impact of model specification on a sample of European listed firms. 
Section 4 concludes the paper and offers recommendations for future research. 
2. Sample and data  
For our empirical analysis, we focus on two models widely employed in the value relevance 
literature: the Price Regression Model (PRM) and the Return Regression Model (RRM). These 
models constitute the basis to examine the value relevance of book value of equity and earnings, as 
well as specific items of financial statements, such as research and development expenditure (Aboody 
and Lev, 1998; Kallapur and Kwan, 2004).
1
 
The PRM involves estimating a regression of stock price (P) on book value (BVPS) and earnings 
(EPS) per share (Barth et al., 2008):
2
 
Pit = a + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit       (Eq. 1) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N represent firms, t = 1, 2, …, T represent years.  
The RRM is based on a regression of stock returns on earnings per share and changes in earnings 
per share: 
itititititit ePEPScPbEPSaRET   11 //      (Eq. 2) 
where 
1
1

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it
ititit
it
P
PDPSP
RET and ΔEPSit = EPSit – EPSit–1 (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
                                                             
1 These models have also been the focus of similar papers that have examined methodological issues in value 
relevance models, such as Barth and Clinch (2009), who evaluate the possibility of omitted variables bias in the 
PRM and RRM, and the importance of scale effects. 
2
 We focus on this model, which is based on per-share values, because it is less likely to be prone to scale effects 
than models based on the market value of equity, book value of equity, and earnings. Some studies also use 
market value of equity, book value of equity, and earnings, rather than the per share figures, and in certain cases 
the variables are adjusted for scale effects through a common deflator. For an explanation of the consequences 
of using different specifications and deflators, see Barth and Clinch (2009). 
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Where P is the stock price as at six months after fiscal year-end (Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 
2008) and DPS denotes dividends per share. For simplicity, in the discussion below we use the 
notation DEPS = (EPSit /Pit–1) and ΔDEPS  = (ΔEPSit /Pit–1). All variables are winsorised at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentile to reduce the potential impact of outliers. 
We collect accounting data for sample of European listed companies from Amadeus for 71 
industries,
3
 selected on the basis of the first two digits of the U.S. SIC code,
4
 and 17 European 
countries. Price data are collected from Datastream. We choose to examine European listed firms 
because the majority of the recent value-relevance studies have focused on Europe, especially to 
assess the impact of IFRS reporting on value relevance (Devalle et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2014). The 
cross-country nature of our sample enables us test the robustness of our analysis across different 
institutional, regulatory and cultural settings (McLeay and Jafaar, 2007; Christensen et al., 2013a, 
2013b; Veith and Werner, 2014).  
We choose 2005 as the beginning of our sample period because prior to 2005 even listed firms 
could use domestic GAAP and this may produce some noise in the data. We choose 2013 as final year 
because most of the papers on IFRS focus on sample periods shorter than ten years.  
Our initial sample consists of 5,164 companies. To eliminate inconsistencies due to different 
reporting dates, we consider only firms with fiscal year-end as of December 31
st
. This selection 
criterion results in 1,208 companies leaving the sample. We also exclude companies with a negative 
book value (15 companies). Data availability for our main variables of interest, P, BVPS, and EPS, 
during the sample period 2005-2013 results in 2,860 companies selected. For the RRM, for which we 
need data also on DPS and the first lag of P, we have 2,459 companies. In Appendix A we report the 
composition of our sample and the mean of each variables. 
                                                             
3
 The initial number of industries in the sample is 73. For two of these industries, data availability for the 
variables employed in the regressions results in zero observations in the regressions. Therefore, effectively we 
have 71 industry clusters. 
4 The two-digit SIC code is commonly employed in accounting research to identify industry clusters (see, 
among others, Shalev et al., 2013). 
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As shown in Figure 1, the sample is unbalanced, with firms exiting and entering the sample over 
time, causing drastic changes in market capitalization and sample size. The most dramatic change 
seems to be in conjunction with the financial crisis (2008-2009). We therefore have an unbalanced 
panel data set, and attrition bias (Hausman and Wise, 1979) may be present. We address this issue in 
sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
3. Empirical examination of model specification 
3.1. Choosing among OLS, RE models and FE models 
We start our empirical examination by offering evidence on the importance of two tests: the 
Hausman test, which is employed to choose between the FE and the RE model; and the Breusch-
Pagan LM test, which indicates whether a researcher should use the RE model or the OLS model.  
We argue that selecting the wrong econometric model is a serious problem because it can lead to 
wrong inferences. For example, choosing the RE model when the FE model should be preferred 
(because the Hausman test is significant) may lead to wrong coefficient estimates. This bias may 
significantly affect the magnitude (and, potentially, sign) of the coefficients for the PRM or RRM 
model. On the other hand, if the Hausman test is insignificant the RE model should be chosen, and 
using the FE model may result in statistically insignificant coefficients even when they would be 
statistically significant for the RE model. Similarly, if the Breusch-Pagan LM test is significant, the 
RE model should be preferred. However, if the Breusch-Pagan LM test is insignificant, the pooled 
OLS model will be more efficient than the RE model. 
In Table 1 we report the results of estimating the PRM and RRM on the whole sample, and we 
employ the “robust” Hausman test (Arellano, 1993, and Wooldridge, 2002, and 2010) and the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test to understand which model should be employed. Table 1 shows that using the 
RE model for the PRM leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates, because the Hausman p-value is 
0.000 (see table in Table 1, Panel A). This is consistent with the large difference in the coefficients for 
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the RE and FE models, suggesting that the RE model leads to inconsistent estimates. Conversely, 
using the FE model for the RRM leads to an insignificant coefficient for ΔDEPS (see table in Table 1, 
Panel B), while using the RE model results in significant coefficients for both ΔDEPS and DEPS. This 
is consistent with the higher efficiency for the RE estimator relative to the FE estimator. Note that, as 
evidenced by the Hausman p-value (0.197), the RE model should be preferred to the FE model. The 
Breusch-Pagan LM test results for Panel B suggest that the RE model should be preferred to the OLS 
model, because the P-value is less than 0.05.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
In Table 2 we provide the results of robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan LM tests for 
country-based sub-samples. In Table 2 we denote the robust version of the Hausman test AW, the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test BP.
5
 This table is connected with Tables 3 and 4 (reported below), and in 
particular specification (3), which includes firm FE, and specification (1), which considers a pooled 
OLS without any FE.  
The results reported in Table 2 show that in 13 out of 17 cases for the PRM we reject the null 
hypothesis that the RE model is consistent, and we find evidence that the FE model is the most 
suitable method for the estimation of the PRM. For certain countries (for example, Portugal), lack of 
significance for the Hausman test may be due to the small number of observations, which may reduce 
the power of the test (Clark and Linzer, 2015). Conversely, the model with firm FE does not perform 
very well for the RRM: only for 9 out of 17 countries is the model with firm FE preferred to the RE 
model. The RE model is preferred for countries with a large number of observations (such as France), 
and even for the whole sample considering all 17 countries. This finding suggests that, in this case, 
the number of observations is unlikely to be the main cause for lack of significance of the Hausman 
test. Further, the results for the Breusch-Pagan LM test suggest that in six out of the nine cases (the 
eight cases for the individual countries and the case for the whole sample) the pooled OLS should be 
                                                             
5 Using the original version of the Hausman test also results in similar rejection rates. However, the results for 
the two tests is inconsistent for certain countries. Therefore, choosing the robust version of the Hausman test is 
important. 
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the preferred model (in other words, the FE model and the RE model do not perform better than the 
pooled OLS model). Some of these cases refer to countries with a small number of observations (for 
example, Luxembourg or Ireland). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
3.2. Results for country-based sub-samples: coefficient estimates and statistical significance 
In Tables 3 and 4 we report the results (coefficient estimates and statistical significance level) for 
six different specifications for the PRM and the RRM, respectively, for 17 regressions (one for each 
country in the sample):
6
  
i) Pooled OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level (model 1); 
ii) Pooled OLS with year FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level 
(model 2); 
iii) FE model (where the panel unit is the firm), with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
clustered on the firm level (model 3); 
iv) FE model (where the panel unit is the firm) with year FE, and with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, clustered on the firm level (model 4); 
v) Pooled OLS with industry FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm 
level (model 5); 
vi) Pooled OLS with industry and year FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on 
the firm level (model 6).
7
 
                                                             
6 We decide to cluster the standard errors on the firm level because the number of industries is less than 20 for 
six countries, and papers such as Cameron and Miller (2015), Carter et al. (2013), Kezdi (2004), and 
Wooldridge (2003) warn against clustering the standard errors when the number of clusters is small. In 
particular, Carter et al. (2013) suggest that even when the actual number of clusters is above 20 the “effective” 
number of clusters can be smaller once cluster heterogeneity is allowed for. This is likely to be the case in our 
sample, because the number of observations for each cluster is not fixed (that is, we have unbalanced clusters). 
For Luxembourg we have a number of firms smaller than 20: this suggests the results for Luxembourg should be 
read with caution because the standard errors may be biased. For this reason, we run the six regressions for 
Luxembourg even without clustering. The results for the regressions without clustering (untabulated but 
available upon request) suggest that clustering in this case generates smaller standard errors. 
7 None of the firms in the sample changes industry or country of origin during the sample period. For this 
reason, we cannot include both firm FE and industry FE or (in the analysis for the whole sample) both firm FE 
and country FE. We resort to testing the impact of industry FE and country FE in regressions without firm FE. 
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The results suggest that the type of specification chosen bears a strong impact on the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the coefficients of the variables, and, in some cases, even the sign of the 
coefficient changes. For instance, in Table 3 (PRM), we find that for several countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Norway), when we introduce both firm FE and year FE the sign coefficient 
of BVPS changes from positive (pooled OLS case) to negative. For some countries (e.g. Germany), 
the introduction of firm FE and year FE causes a dramatic reduction in the size and statistical 
significance of the coefficient on BVPS (from 1.183, significant at the 1% level) to 0.108 
(insignificant).  
Wilcoxon and two-sample t-tests (reported at the bottom of Table 3) suggest that adding firm FE, 
country FE, or industry FE leads to significantly different coefficients for EPS, but not for BVPS. 
Adding only year FE does not lead to significantly different coefficients in comparison with the 
pooled OLS model. The coefficient on BVPS is significant at the 5% level only in eight cases out of 
17 for specifications (1), (2), and (3), in nine cases for specification (4) and in ten cases for 
specifications (5) and (6).  
The coefficient on EPS is significant in seven cases of out 17 for specification (5), in eight cases 
for specification (6), and in nine cases for specifications (1) – (4). In other words, the specification 
chosen affects inferences on whether BVPS or EPS bear an impact on stock price.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, Table 4 highlights that there are substantial 
changes for the slope coefficients and related statistical significance of both of the variables of the 
RRM when firm FE or industry FE are included. The average coefficient on DEPS tends to increase 
as a result of the inclusion of firm FE from 0.85 to 1.83 (this difference is significant, according to 
both Wilcoxon tests and two-sample t-tests), while the coefficients on ΔDEPS tend to decrease (the 
mean drops from 0.34 to -0.36, and the Wilcoxon and two-sample t-tests are significant at the 1% 
level). The coefficient for ΔDEPS in the models with firm FE (and even in the model with both 
industry and year FE) is negative, which is counterintuitive (a positive change in earnings decreases 
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stock returns).
8
 This result is not due to an outlier that is pushing the average coefficient for ΔDEPS 
below zero (as said above, we winsorise all variables).
9
  
When industry FE (but not year FE) are in the regressions, the results are similar to those for the 
model without year FE, firm FE or industry FE (pooled OLS), and also to those of the specification 
with only year FE. However, when both industry FE and year FE are considered, the results are 
similar to those with both firm FE and year FE. As for the statistical significance of the models, the 
results for the coefficients on DEPS are significant in 11 cases out of 17 for specifications (1), (3), and 
(4), in nine cases for specification (2), and in eight cases for specifications (5) and (6). For ΔDEPS, 
there are only six significant cases for specifications (1) and (2), and including firm FE reduces 
further the number of significant coefficients (four when only firm FE are included, in model (3), and 
two if both firm and year FE are included, in model (4)). For models (5) and (6) there are three and 
five significant coefficients, respectively.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In Tables 3 and 4 we have clustered the standard errors on the firm level. Because of the 
importance of clustering the standard errors (Petersen, 2009), we now briefly examine the impact of 
running the same regressions without clustering. These results are untabulated but available from the 
authors upon request. As reported above, for Luxembourg the number of firm-clusters is relatively 
small and this may have led to biased standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). However, when we 
estimate the regressions without clustering on the firm level, the results in terms of statistical 
significance of the coefficients on BVPS and EPS remain unaltered relative to those reported in Table 
3. The results related to Table 4, instead, change in a number of cases. The number of significant 
                                                             
8 The high proportion of negative coefficients for ΔDEPS decreases substantially when we employ Earnings 
Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), instead of earnings. This suggests that the transitory earnings issue (Ota, 
2003) may be causing such counterintuitive results. 
9 For the specification with only year FE, the coefficient on ΔDEPS is positive in 15 cases out of 17, while in the 
model with firm FE (and that with both firm and year FE), the coefficient is positive in only four cases out of 
17, and in the remaining 13 cases it becomes negative. 
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coefficients on DEPS increases when there is no clustering for all six specifications,
10
 suggesting that 
neglecting within-firm correlation may lead to upward biased standard errors. However, this is not the 
case for the coefficients on ΔDEPS, for which the number of significant coefficients decreases, 
increases, or remains the same.
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We now examine briefly the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 in conjunction with the results 
reported in Table 2. For the sake of brevity, we focus on several cases that stand out. For example, for 
Italy the results for the PRM coefficients are significant only when firm FE are included 
(specifications (3) and (4) in Table 3). The results in Table 2 for the robust version of the Hausman 
test confirm that firm FE matter: the p-value for Italy for the PRM is 0.006. Similarly, the results in 
Table 4 for Austria suggest that the coefficient on ΔDEPS is positive and significant when firm FE are 
not included (columns (1) and (2) of Table 4) and negative and insignificant when firm FE are 
included. The p-value for the robust version of the Hausman test is 0.002, confirming that including 
firm FE has a significant impact on the coefficient estimates, and the RE and OLS coefficient 
estimates are therefore inconsistent.  
3.3 The role of different types of fixed effects and attrition 
In Table 5, we report the results of OLS regressions for the PRM and RRM where year FE, 
country FE, and industry FE are included, while firm FE are excluded. We also report F-tests to show 
the incremental explanatory power of each type of FE. This is useful to examine whether a type of FE 
is redundant once the other types of FE are included. All types of FE are important, as the F-tests are 
significant at either the 1% or 5% level. This finding suggests that time-varying (but panel-invariant) 
variables captured by year effects, industry time-invariant variables, and country time-invariant 
variables are, at least to some extent, independent of each other. 
                                                             
10 The number of significant coefficients on DEPS increases when clustering is not performed, as follows: from 
11 to 13 for specification (1), from nine to 13 for specification (2), from 11 to 12 for specifications (3) and (4), 
from eight to 12 for specification (5) and from eight to ten for specification (6). 
11  The number of significant coefficients on ΔDEPS increases when clustering is not performed for 
specifications (4) and (5), remains the same for specifications (1) and (2), and decreases for specifications (3) 
and (6).  
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Tables 6 and 7 we dig deeper into the impact of unobserved heterogeneity by comparing the 
results for a pooled OLS model with those of models that allow for a variety of FE: i) pooled OLS; ii) 
year FE; iii) firm FE; iv) both firm and year FE; v) industry FE; vi) industry and year FE; and vii) 
country and year FE.
12
  
Finally, to examine the potential impact of attrition, we also run the regressions with firm and 
year FE with a balanced panel of 528 firms that are in our sample throughout the period from 2005 to 
2013 (model (8)). The remaining firms come from 15 countries (we lose Luxembourg and Denmark) 
and 56 industries. 
Consistent with the results reported above for the 17 country sub-samples (Table 3), the results 
reported in Table 6 demonstrate that adding firm FE reduces the coefficient on EPS (from around 4.5 
to around 1.8) in the PRM. The coefficient on BVPS in the PRM also decreases (from around 0.76 to 
around 0.34). Industry FE, country FE and year FE bear a negligible effect on either coefficient. 
According to Amir et al. (2016), as the number of industries increases, the importance of industry FE 
should increase. However, despite the fact that we have 71 industry clusters but only 17 country 
clusters, industry FE are not more important than country FE. This finding suggests that heterogeneity 
at the industry level for European studies is not very strong. Only firm FE result in a substantial 
decrease in the coefficients on both BVPS and EPS, which remain statistically significant for all 
specifications. Firm FE also result in a substantial decrease in R-squared values. In specification (8), 
where we use a balanced panel of 528 firms for a model with both firm FE and year FE, the 
explanatory power of the model increases relative to the corresponding specification with an 
                                                             
12 In untabulated results, we also look at the impact of country-level institutional factors such as: Rule of law, 
which captures the degree to which agents trust the rules of society, as well as quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, police, and the courts (source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Database, 
www.govindicators.org); Absence, which proxies for the extent to which a topic is covered only by IAS/IFRS 
but not by domestic accounting standards and Divergence, which measures the extent to which rules for the 
same item differ between domestic accounting standards and IAS/IFRS (Nobes, 2001); Control of Corruption, 
which represents the extent to which public power is perceived to be used for private gain (source: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Database, www.govindicators.org); and Legal Origin, which proxies for the legal origin 
of the company law or commercial code of each country as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). The results are very 
similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.  
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unbalanced panel: the R-squared increases from 21.2% to 37%.
13
 This finding indicates that the 
association between market and book values for new firms and firms that eventually become delisted 
is weaker than for other firms, which in turn may indicate attrition bias, which is particularly harmful 
for FE models (Verbeek, 1990).  
[Insert Table 6 Here]  
The results in Table 7 confirm the results reported in Table 4 with respect to the impact of firm 
FE on the coefficients of both DEPS and ΔDEPS: firm FE result in an increase of the coefficient on 
DEPS and a decrease in the coefficient on ΔDEPS. Unlike in the sub-sample estimations, the 
coefficient on ΔDEPS does not become negative. Industry and country FE do not bear a significant 
impact on the coefficient estimates of either variable. The coefficients on DEPS are significant for all 
specifications but those on ΔDEPS are insignificant when firm FE are included. The inclusion of year 
FE is associated with a strong increase in R-squared values. This finding suggests that the RRM 
model is highly sensitive to macroeconomic changes that affect all firms in a certain year. Finally, the 
results for the FE model with year FE when we use a balanced panel of 528 firms suggest that the R-
squared improves relative to that of the same regression on an unbalanced panel (from 33.7% to 
41.1%). This finding is consistent with the results reported for the PRM in Table 6. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on DEPS increases. The coefficient on ΔDEPS remains insignificant, similar to what 
reported for the unbalanced panel.
14
  
[Insert Table 7 Here]  
3.4 Monte Carlo simulations 
The results of our empirical analysis show that replacing firm FE with other types of FE may be 
inappropriate, consistent with the findings by Amir et al. (2016), based on Monte Carlo simulations. 
Amir et al. (2016), however, focus on a fixed number of periods (10). In this section, we examine the 
                                                             
13 This is the “within” R-squared, based on the variation within firm clusters. 
14 In untabulated results, we have run regressions that exclude countries for which the RE model is preferred to 
the FE model as reported in Tables 3 and 4. The results are substantially the same as those reported in Tables 6 
and 7. 
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impact of the length of the sample period and attrition on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE. 
In particular, we provide an examination of the impact of omitting firm FE when year, country, and 
industry FE are included on the bias of the coefficients. We also compare the size of the standard 
errors of the coefficients across specifications, to evaluate the relative efficiency of the OLS, RE and 
FE model.  
Our Monte Carlo simulations are calibrated according to the parameter values estimated in the 
previous section and reported in Table 5.
 
For the sake of brevity, we focus our discussion on the PRM, 
but our results extend to the RRM as well.  
The specifications considered are as follows: i) pooled OLS; ii) OLS with year FE; iii) OLS with 
year and country FE; iv) OLS with year and industry FE; v) RE model with year FE; and vi) FE 
model (that is, model with firm FE) with year FE. 
We run 500 replications using simulated data for a sample of firms with the same composition (in 
terms of country and industry of origin of the firms) as that used for the empirical analysis above. This 
is done by replacing the data for P, BVPS and EPS for each firm in the dataset with simulated data. 
For the simulations, we keep in our dataset only firms for which we have information about the 
country and SIC code. The number of firms is therefore 2,842, as in Table 6, (models (5) and (6)). To 
understand how the length of the sample period affects the bias in the coefficients and standard errors, 
we run the replications considering 10 periods for Panel A and 5 periods for Panel B (that is, T =  10 
in the first case, and T = 5 in the second case).  Moreover, to examine the effect of attrition bias, Panel 
C considers a maximum number of periods equal to 10 (Max(T) = 10), but with attrition bias leading 
to an average time span equal to 9 periods (T-bar = 9).
15
 More details on the Data Generating Process 
(DGP) are presented in the notes below Table 8. 
In both cases (T = 10, and T = 5), the models with the firm and year FE provide the smallest bias 
in both the coefficients and standard errors of the coefficients. The results show that the average 
                                                             
15 As explained in the notes to Table 8, we allow 20% of the firms to exit the sample from the sixth period 
onwards (50% of the sample period). This results in a loss of (20% * 50%) = 10% of the observations. 
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coefficient bias increases as T decreases when firm FE are not included. For Panel C, we find that the 
bias is slightly bigger than for T = 10, but smaller than for T = 5, consistent with the fact that T-bar = 
9. The bias is larger for OLS models, and slightly smaller for the RE model. However, in both cases 
the bias is substantial. Even the bias for the standard errors is smallest for the FE model with year FE. 
These findings suggest that the impact of neglecting firm FE becomes bigger as T decreases, and 
attrition bias exacerbates this problem. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4. Conclusions and implications for future research 
In this study, we have investigated whether unobserved heterogeneity is important in value-
relevance research as it is in other areas of the economics and finance literature.  
We have used a large panel of European listed firms to investigate the impact of firm FE, industry 
FE, and country FE on the coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics and p-values. While 
most empirical studies on value relevance focus their discussion on the estimated t-statistics and p-
values, wrong coefficient estimates can seriously impair the validity of the economic interpretation of 
valuation models. For example, in the PRM, the coefficient on EPS represents the change in stock 
price following a change by one unit in EPS. Therefore, a biased regression coefficient can lead 
researchers to over- or under-estimate the importance of changes in EPS when assessing the value of a 
company. This problem is also likely to undermine the reliability of empirical studies evaluating the 
effects of the changes in accounting regulation on capital markets, leading to important implications 
for policy making. A positive and statistically significant coefficient is not enough to evaluate the 
impact of a regulation, because policy makers are often interested in the change in the magnitude of 
the coefficient. For example, an increase in the coefficient on EPS in the post-IFRS period may be 
interpreted as an indication of stronger value relevance of EPS (Devalle et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we have offered several important contributions. First, we have uncovered important 
cross-country heterogeneities in the importance of firm FE for both the PRM and RRM when these 
17 
 
models are employed separately for each of the country-based sub-samples. Industry FE, on the other 
hand, do not appear to bear a substantial impact on inferences, despite the fact that the number of 
industry dummies in our sample is rather large (71). In particular, we show that neglecting firm FE in 
the estimation of the PRM and RRM may lead to a substantial bias in both the size of the coefficients 
and the corresponding t-statistics of the variables of the PRM and RRM. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, we have shown that the bias increases as the sample period becomes shorter, or in the 
presence of attrition bias.  
Second, our results have demonstrated that both industry FE and country FE bear a negligible 
effect on the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients. For this reason, allowing for 
industry FE and country FE may not be enough to correctly estimate the impact of the variables in the 
PRM and RRM for studies based on European listed firms. 
Finally, we examine the impact of clustering the standard errors and attrition and we find that 
both of them can lead to wrong inferences. Clustering the standard errors should allow for the impact 
of a small number of cluster on the bias of the standard error estimates. Attrition is particularly 
important for studies that consider the period of the financial crisis, because of the large number of 
firms that exit the sample during this period. 
To decide whether to add or not firm FE in the estimation of the PRM and RRM in a European 
setting, we suggest that researchers employ “robust” Hausman tests, because the choice between RE 
and FE models is sample-dependent and thus which model should be preferred cannot be determined 
a priori.  If the RE model is preferred, researchers should also test whether the pooled OLS model 
may be appropriate using the Breusch-Pagan LM test. Further, we suggest that year FE be included in 
the regression, unless the researcher is interested in the effect of time-varying macroeconomic 
components whose coefficients would be unidentified in the presence of year FE. Robustness tests 
considering the impact of industry and country FE and clustering the standard errors on different 
levels (including two-level clustering) may also be useful. 
18 
 
To support researchers interested in value relevance studies in Europe, we also provide a 
“toolbox" in Table 9, which summarises the main implications of our findings.  
[Insert Table 9 Here]  
Clearly, we have not assessed the influence of different estimation techniques on the PRM and 
RRM under all conceivable conditions. However, our findings support researchers interested in 
evaluating the impact of regulation on value relevance by offering guidance on how different 
econometric models may impinge on the estimation of the PRM and RRM.  
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Table 1: Impact of using incorrectly the FE model or the RE model. 
 Panel A  Panel B  
 PRM PRM RRM RRM 
All countries RE model FE model RE model FE model 
     
BVPS 0.635*** 0.340***   
 (0.086) (0.107)   
EPS 2.290*** 1.858***   
 (0.367) (0.331)   
DEPS   0.395*** 0.723** 
   (0.124) (0.322) 
ΔDEPS   0.209*** 0.076 
   (0.042) (0.110) 
Constant 13.064*** 24.978*** 0.037*** 0.008 
 (1.905) (2.957) (0.012) (0.031) 
Hausman AW 0.000  0.197  
Breusch-Pagan LM   0.000  
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Observations 15,656 15,656 11,424 11,424 
Number of firms 2,860 2,860 2,459 2,459 
R-squared (overall) 0.7617 0.7645 0.0320 0.0283 
Notes: The two specifications employed are as follows: 
Panel A: PRM: Pit = a + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit   
Where Pit is stock price, as at six months after fiscal year-end (Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008). BVPSit and EPSit are the book 
value per share, and the earnings per share, respectively. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Panel B: RRM: 
itititititit ePEPScPbEPSaRET   11 //
 
where 
1
1


it
ititit
it
P
PDPSP
RET and ΔEPSit = EPSit – EPSit–1 (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
Hausman AW refers to the refinement of Hausman’s test by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, 2010) method, which allows for 
errors that are not Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). Breusch-Pagan LM denotes Breusch-Pagan LM test for the choics of either 
RE model or Pooled OLS.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Results for the robust Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests for PRM and RRM for 17 European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRM PRM RRM RRM 
 AW BP AW BP 
Country p-value p-value p-value p-value 
Austria 0.000 
 
0.002  
Belgium 0.063 0.000 0.009  
Denmark 0.000  0.001  
Finland 0.000  0.005  
France 0.000  0.552 0.000 
Germany 0.000  0.016  
Greece 0.329 0.000 0.000  
Ireland 0.000  a) 1.000 
Italy 0.006  0.000 
 
Lux.burg 0.048  0.127 0.403 
Neth.nds 0.419 0.000 0.707 0.325 
Norway 0.000 
 
a) 1.000 
Portugal 0.164 0.000 0.652 0.224 
Spain 0.005  0.030 
 
Sweden 0.000  0.164 0.015 
Switz.nd 0.000  a) 1.000 
UK 0.001  0.000 
 
ALL 0.000  0.197 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the p-values for robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan tests to choose between FE models, RE models, and OLS models. PRM stands for Price Regression Model and RRM stands 
for Return Regression Model. For more information on these models, see notes to Table 1 and equations (1) and (2). AW refers to the refinement of Hausman’s test by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, 2010) 
method, which allows for errors that are not Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). BP denotes Breusch-Pagan LM test for choosing between the RE model and a Pooled OLS.  
a)
 The estimates for the RE model 
are degenerate, because the value for theta suggests that the pooled OLS model is to be preferred. Rejection of the null hypothesis for AW (p-value < 0.05 for a 5% significance level) suggests that the FE model should 
be preferred to the RE model. Rejection of the null hypothesis for BP (p-value < 0.05 for a 5% significance level) suggests that the RE model should be preferred to the pooled model.  
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Table 3: Results for the PRM regressions for 17 European countries: estimated coefficients for BVPS and EPS. 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Country BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS 
Austria 0.959*** 3.432 0.921*** 3.839 2.376*** 1.941 2.363*** 1.887 0.952*** 3.579 0.916*** 3.973 
Belgium 0.824*** 3.722** 0.822*** 3.761** 0.978* 1.086 0.978* 1.141 0.899*** 2.978** 0.887*** 3.082** 
Denmark 0.602 6.178 0.608 6.097 -0.142 3.411*** -0.159 3.087*** 0.794* 4.128 0.817* 3.846 
Finland 0.459 5.604** 0.467 5.538** -0.530*** 5.412*** -0.496** 5.190*** 0.514 5.204** 0.539 5.013** 
France 0.622*** 5.687*** 0.622*** 5.677*** 0.223 1.525*** 0.225 1.463*** 0.626*** 5.449*** 0.627*** 5.437*** 
Germany 1.183*** -0.806 1.187*** -0.830 0.119 0.872 0.108 0.842 1.099*** -0.746 1.106*** -0.783 
Greece 0.431*** 4.841*** 0.446*** 4.751*** 0.452*** 5.947*** 0.479*** 5.765*** 0.388*** 3.413* 0.408*** 3.296* 
Ireland 0.945 11.591*** 0.812 12.287*** 3.911*** -0.033 3.634*** 0.769 1.771** 5.610* 1.519** 6.508** 
Italy 0.142 2.260 0.153 2.088 1.079*** 1.764*** 1.106*** 1.543** 0.225 1.577 0.235 1.369 
Lux.burg 0.007 0.675 -0.011 0.981* 0.003 -0.021 -0.038** 0.316*** 0.021 -1.972 -0.041 -0.401 
Neth.nds 1.024*** 2.109 1.037*** 2.026 1.085*** 2.462 1.164*** 2.257 0.807*** 2.223 0.824*** 2.112 
Norway 0.872*** 2.658* 0.882*** 2.570* -0.165 1.252** -0.091 1.131* 0.834*** 1.261 0.846*** 1.168 
Portugal 0.095 3.774** 0.109 3.721** 1.125 2.062 1.222 1.746 0.255 3.772** 0.247 3.722** 
Spain 0.696* -0.004 0.705* -0.033 0.167* 4.521*** 0.162* 4.600*** 0.305* 0.267 0.308* 0.254 
Sweden 0.252 7.161*** 0.252 7.165*** 0.610*** 4.210*** 0.617*** 4.168*** 0.287* 6.727*** 0.287* 6.724*** 
Switz.nd 0.391*** 9.081*** 0.385*** 9.122*** 0.580*** 2.814*** 0.516*** 2.855*** 0.459*** 8.570*** 0.455*** 8.605*** 
UK 0.304 2.748*** 0.287 2.835*** 0.446* 0.635 0.419* 0.737* 0.620*** 2.203*** 0.602*** 2.282*** 
Wilcoxon   0.8313 0.7946 0.7226 0.0277** 0.5862 0.0245** 0.2868 0.0036*** 0.2868 0.0049*** 
Two-sample  
t-test 
  0.4416 0.3436 0.5602 0.0483** 0.5595 0.0384** 0.3268 0.0185** 0.3759 0.0160** 
 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients for the variables of the PRM using a variety of specifications with different types of fixed effects (FE). PRM stands for Price Regression Model. For more information on 
this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (1). The six specifications employed are as follows: (1) Pooled OLS, (2) Pooled OLS with year fixed-effects, (3) FE regression (firm fixed-effects), (4) FE regression with 
year fixed-effects, (5) OLS with industry fixed-effects, (6) OLS with both industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Wilcoxon 
denotes the p-value for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) on the distributions of the coefficients for BVPS and EPS for specification (1) as compared to specifications (2) – (6). The null hypothesis is that 
both distributions are the same. Two- sample t-test reports the p-value for a test for equality of means of the distribution of the coefficient for specification (1) as compared to specifications (2) – (6). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Results for the RRM regressions for 17 European countries: estimated coefficients for DEPS and ΔDEPS. 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Country DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS 
Austria 1.247** 2.536*** 1.170** 2.008*** 6.009*** -1.306 4.346** -0.598 1.471 1.914* 0.986 1.519 
Belgium 0.560** 0.199 0.515** 0.099 1.218*** -0.341 1.224*** -0.429 0.578** 0.164 0.569** 0.027 
Denmark 1.261 0.336 1.054 0.264 1.703 -0.660 1.713 -0.717 1.190 0.313 1.024 0.237 
Finland 0.080 0.157 0.132 0.080 0.243 -0.081 0.448* -0.215 0.155 0.061 0.199 -0.010 
France 0.396 0.28*** 0.375* 0.215** 0.357 0.276*** 0.346 0.198*** 0.396 0.270*** 0.376* 0.207** 
Germany 0.471*** 0.294*** 0.426*** 0.285*** 1.192*** -0.090 1.129*** -0.087 0.454** 0.295*** 0.404*** 0.288*** 
Greece 1.693*** 0.904*** 0.945*** 0.931*** 3.231*** 0.119 2.030*** 0.302 1.964*** 0.776** 1.112*** 0.831*** 
Ireland 1.250** -0.042 0.903* 0.195 2.471 -1.236 1.991** -1.015 1.794* -0.557 1.361* -0.311 
Italy 0.730*** 0.421** 0.401** 0.562*** 2.098*** -0.531** 1.194*** -0.070 1.043*** 0.260 0.657*** 0.439*** 
Lux.burg 0.197** 0.011 0.225* -0.029 0.377*** -0.075** 0.347*** -0.048 -1.252 7.257 a) a) 
Neth.nds 0.513 -0.026 0.436 0.032 0.595 0.024 0.586 0.059 0.605 0.038 0.485 0.083 
Norway 0.026 0.546** -0.307 0.630*** 1.535*** -0.299 0.374 0.217 0.340 0.283 -0.085 0.470** 
Portugal 0.842* 0.085 0.731** -0.002 0.409 0.195 1.059* -0.189 0.145 0.253 0.326 0.099 
Spain 0.240** 0.126 0.210* 0.075 0.821*** -0.092 0.687** -0.094 0.263*** 0.123 0.219** 0.081 
Sweden 0.563*** 0.032 0.413** 0.050 1.319** -0.057 1.046** -0.005 0.542** 0.039 0.409** 0.061 
Switz.nd 3.654*** -0.299 2.701*** 0.061 5.627*** -1.626*** 4.001*** -0.969** 3.781*** -0.357 2.790*** 0.022 
UK 0.739*** 0.148 0.739*** 0.142 1.889*** -0.312* 1.772*** -0.306* 0.842*** 0.063 0.842*** 0.055 
Wilcoxon   0.0019*** 0.7583 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.1359 0.1024 0.0340** 0.0879* 
Two-sample  
t-test 
  0.0090*** 0.8861 0.0033** 0.0071*** 0.0036*** 0.0055*** 0.9369 0.4694 0.0329** 0.1704 
 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients for the variables of the RRM using a variety of specifications with different types of fixed effects (FE). RRM stands for Return Regression Model. For more information 
on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (2).  DEPS is earnings per share (EPS) divided by the first lag of stock price and ΔDEPS is the first difference in EPS divided by the first lag of stock price. The six 
specifications employed are as follows: (1) Pooled OLS, (2) Pooled OLS with year fixed-effects, (3) FE regression (firm fixed-effects), (4) FE regression with year fixed-effects, (5) OLS with industry fixed-effects, (6) 
OLS with both industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. 
a)
  For this specification, the number of observations is insufficient to 
estimate the regression parameters. Wilcoxon denotes the p-value for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) on the distributions of the coefficients for DEPS and DEPS for specification (1) as compared to 
specifications (2) – (6). The null hypothesis is that both distributions are the same. Two- sample t-test reports the p-value for a test for equality of means of the distribution of the coefficient for specification (1) as 
compared to specifications (2) – (6).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: OLS regressions where year FE, country FE, and industry FE are included, while 
firm FE are excluded. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 PRM RRM 
   
BVPS 0.730***  
 (72.249)  
EPS 4.306***  
 (44.220)  
DEPS  0.327*** 
  (14.965) 
ΔDEPS  0.188*** 
  (8.028) 
Year, Country, and Industry FE YES YES 
Firm FE NO NO 
F-test for joint significance of Year FE 10.14*** 626.59*** 
F-test for joint significance of Country FE 41.17*** 4.21*** 
F-test for joint significance of Industry FE 7.13*** 1.39** 
Observations 15,656 11,424 
Firms 2,860 2,459 
R-squared 0.782 0.312 
  Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the PRM and RRM models where year FE, country FE, 
and industry FE are included, while firm FE are excluded. PRM stands for Price Regression Model and RRM stands for Return 
Regression Model. For more information on these models, see notes to Table 1 and equations (1) and (2). In Column (1), PRM is 
estimated while Column (2) reports the estimates for the RRM model Constant included in all specifications but not reported.  
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Table 6: Results for the whole sample using different types of fixed effects: PRM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRM OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS (balanced panel) 
 no FE year FE firm FE firm and year 
FE 
industry FE ind. & year FE Country and year FE firm and year FE 
         
BVPS 0.756*** 0.757*** 0.340*** 0.335*** 0.741*** 0.742*** 0.741*** 0.568*** 
 (7.447) (7.433) (3.161) (3.077) (7.356) (7.342) (7.476) (3.982) 
EPS 4.585*** 4.574*** 1.858*** 1.842*** 4.638*** 4.627*** 4.315*** 2.372*** 
 (4.431) (4.408) (5.614) (5.573) (4.507) (4.483) (4.372) (3.841) 
         
Observations 15,656 15,656 15,656 15,656 15,610 15,610 15,656 4,752 
R-squared 0.765 0.766 0.181 0.212 0.769 0.770 0.774 0.370 
         
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 15 
Number of 
industries 
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 56 
Number of 
firms 
2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,842 2,842 2,860 528 
Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the PRM model. PRM stands for Price Regression. For more information on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (1). In 
Column (1), PRM is estimated using Pooled OLS. Column (2) estimates the PRM model using Pooled OLS with year effects, Column (3) is estimated PRM model with firm fixed-effects, Column (4) uses 
FE regression with year fixed-effects to estimate PRM model, Column (5) uses OLS with industry fixed-effects for PRM model, Column (6) uses OLS with both industry and year fixed effects and Column 
(7) uses OLS with country and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Constant included in all specifications but not reported. 
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Table 7: Results for the whole sample using different types of fixed effects: RRM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RRM OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS (balanced panel) 
 no FE year FE firm FE firm and year 
FE 
industry FE ind. & year FE Country and year FE firm and year FE 
         
DEPS 0.354*** 0.315*** 0.723** 0.645** 0.361*** 0.320*** 0.325*** 1.233*** 
 (3.174) (3.239) (2.247) (2.432) (3.103) (3.166) (3.364) (3.026) 
ΔDEPS 0.230*** 0.196*** 0.076 0.051 0.229*** 0.195*** 0.193*** -0.105 
 (5.180) (4.868) (0.692) (0.578) (5.088) (4.798) (4.831) (-0.549) 
         
Observations 11,424 11,424 11,424 11,424 11,401 11,401 11,424 4,224 
R-squared 0.032 0.302 0.040 0.337 0.039 0.308 0.306 0.411 
         
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 15 
Number of 
industries 
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 56 
Number of 
firms 
2,459 2,459 2,459 2,459 2,450 2,450 2,459 528 
  Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the RRM model. RRM stands for Return Regression Model. For more information on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation 
(2). In Column (1), RRM is estimated using Pooled OLS. Column (2) estimates the RRM model using Pooled OLS with year effects, Column (3) is estimated RRM model with firm fixed-effects, Column 
(4) uses FE regression with year fixed-effects to estimate RRM model, Column (5) uses OLS with industry fixed-effects for RRM model, Column (6) uses OLS with both industry and year fixed effects and 
Column (7) uses OLS interacted industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Constant included in all specifications but 
not reported. 
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Table 8: Monte Carlo simulations: Impact of sample period length on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM 
 Variable Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
 
 
Panel A 
T = 10 
Panel B 
T = 5 
Panel C 
Max(T) = 10 
Attrition bias 
T-bar = 9 
OLS without any FE BVPS 0.08293 0.00054 0.13873 0.00101 0.08168 0.00046 
 EPS 0.08258 0.00053 0.13829 0.00080 0.08228 0.00044 
OLS with year FE BVPS 0.08296 0.00054 0.13876 0.00101 0.08171 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08261 0.00053 0.13832 0.00080 0.08229 0.00044 
OLS with year and country FE BVPS 0.08265 0.00054 0.13865 0.00101 0.08149 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08229 0.00053 0.13814 0.00079 0.08207 0.00044 
OLS with year and industry FE BVPS 0.08099 0.00054 0.13705 0.00101 0.07992 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08063 0.00053 0.13659 0.00080 0.08051 0.00044 
RE model with year FE BVPS 0.06531 0.00054 0.11536 0.00099 0.06413 0.00045 
 EPS 0.06493 0.00052 0.11492 0.00078 0.06465 0.00043 
FE model with year FE BVPS 0.00031 0.00021 0.00081 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00006 
 EPS -0.00017 0.00019 0.00042 0.00026 0.00024 0.00004 
Notes: In this Table we report the results of 500 Monte Carlo simulations for the coefficient bias and standard error bias resulting from neglecting firm FE when they are correlated with explanatory variables of 
the PRM: BVPS and EPS. Panel A considers 10 fictitious periods (T = 10), Panel B five periods (T = 5), and Panel C considers maximum number of periods equal to 10, but we attrition bias leading to an average time 
span equal to 9 periods.  
In Columns denoted with (1), (3), and  (5) we report the coefficient bias, that is, the average difference between the coefficient value used to simulate the DGP (see equation below) and the estimated coefficient 
for each of the 500 simulations. In Columns (2), (4), and (6) we report average difference (in absolute value) between the estimated standard errors and the true standard errors, calculated following Petersen (2009). To 
ensure that the simulations are comparable to our sample in terms number of firms in each industry and country, we consider all the firms in our dataset that have a SIC number (2,842), but we replace the actual data on 
P, BVPS and EPS with simulated data. In particular, we employ the following Data Generating Processes (DGP): 
Pit = 0.730BVPSit + 4.306EPSit + ci + si + ηi + yt + uit      
Where ci stand for the country-level factors (time invariant), si are industry-level factors (time invariant), ηi are firm-level factors,
 16 yt are time-varying factors (the same for all fictitious firms), and uit is a standard 
normal variable with mean zero and variance one. BVPSit and EPSit are simulated as normal variables. To ensure that macroeconomic shocks at the country level are independent of industry-level shocks, and firm-
specific shocks are independent of both country-level and industry-level shocks (formally, ci   si   ηi) we assign randomly each firm to a country and industry. We simulate these shocks so that the distribution of 
each shock is normal. For Panel C, we allow 20% of the firms to exit the sample from the sixth period onwards (50% of the sample period). This results in a loss of 20% * 50% = 10% of the observations, and an 
average sample period equal to 9 periods (that is, 10  – 0.1*10).   
  
                                                             
16 These could be interpreted as different types of macro- (that is, industry or country level) and micro-economic shocks. 
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Table 9: Tips for applied researchers. 
Econometric Issue Suggested approach 
How to choose among FE model, RE model, and OLS model 
Run the robust version of the Hausman test:  
1. If significant, use FE model; 
2. If insignificant, Breusch-Pagan LM test: 
a. If significant, use RE model; 
b. If insignificant, use OLS model. 
 
In cross-country studies, we suggest that the researchers compare the results for the whole sample with those 
for country-based sub-sample. For countries with a small number of firms, the results of the tests should be 
considered with caution. 
 
Note: In some cases, a researcher may decide that it is appropriate to include firm FE (regardless of the 
result of robust Hausman tests) because:  
1. There is little time-series variation in explanatory variables. For example, this may happen if the 
PRM or RRM models are augmented with corporate governance variables.  
2. The researcher believes that accounting data is uncorrelated with time-invariant unobserved factors. 
However, in this case, we suggest that the researcher clarifies the reasons for her assumption and 
briefly discusses the robust Hausman test results. 
How to deal with year FE, industry FE and country FE 
Industry FE and country FE cannot replace firm FE.  
 
Year FE are needed unless time-varying macroeconomic components that are the same for each firm are 
included (e.g., GDP for single-country study). 
 
Note: Depending on the research questions, robustness tests considering the impact of industry and country 
FE may also be useful. In certain cases, the researcher may want to examine time-invariant factors that are 
not necessarily unique to the individual.  
Clustering 
Clustering at the firm level is generally needed as standard errors are more conservative. 
 
When number of clusters is small, this can lead to biased standard errors – consider alternative level of 
clustering (for example, firm level, instead of country level). 
 
Robustness checks considering the impact of clustering the standard errors on different levels (including two-
level clustering) may be helpful. 
Attrition bias 
Allow for potential attrition bias, especially for FE models.  
Studies with a sample period that includes the financial crisis, which can lead to a sudden drop in the number 
of sample firms, should consider the impact of attrition on coefficient estimates as well as R-squared values. 
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Figure 1. Number of sample firms and total market capitalisation for the whole sample (in 
millions of Euros) during 2005-2013. 
a) 
 
b) 
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Appendix A. Sample composition. 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns Country Obs.ns Firms SIC P BVPS EPS RET DEPS ΔDEPS 
            Mean 
01 17 28 472 48 275 72 63 AUSTRIA 117 37 12 68.684 52.424 5.061 0.169 0.105 0.002 
02 43 29 56 49 365 73 1.522 BELGIUM 626 107 28 64.629 49.745 4.809 0.046 0.095 -0.004 
07 0 30 145 50 529 75 29 DENMARK 224 71 19 70.271 82.024 8.274 0.193 0.098 0.004 
09 11 32 199 51 269 76 9 FINLAND 652 100 31 12.758 8.019 1.225 0.043 0.086 0.001 
10 41 33 133 52 23 78 58 FRANCE 3.010 513 50 96.221 78.071 6.377 0.094 0.125 -0.025 
12 16 34 130 53 18 79 91 GERMANY 2.821 509 49 62.343 77.647 7.920 0.109 0.118 0.001 
13 145 35 511 54 13 80 74 GREECE 821 169 42 5.555 4.908 0.518 0.078 0.098 -0.010 
14 54 36 391 55 4 81 0 IRELAND 137 28 17 10.734 4.118 0.608 0.158 0.099 0.006 
15 402 37 201 56 49 82 17 ITALY 935 178 43 9.070 7.520 0.705 0.059 0.088 -0.006 
16 61 38 176 57 22 83 12 LUXEMBOURG 53 18 7 28.956 44.245 4.944 0.114 0.326 0.023 
17 108 39 58 58 59 84 16 NETHERLANDS 596 104 28 101.626 43.950 8.284 0.090 0.097 -0.001 
20 449 40 9 59 68 87 766 NORWAY 473 92 29 12.669 9.744 1.234 0.040 0.113 0.004 
21 18 41 49 60 128 91 5 PORTUGAL 213 40 10 5.318 4.166 0.541 0.057 0.108 -0.003 
22 73 42 33 61 765 94 2 SPAIN 640 124 29 20.164 16.471 3.405 0.031 0.195 0.001 
23 55 43 18 62 42 96 8 SWEDEN 1.261 232 29 11.670 6.806 1.211 0.120 0.102 -0.001 
24 36 44 206 64 64 97 9 SWITZERLAND 888 139 14 482.551 236.072 28.754 0.113 0.073 0.003 
25 58 45 81 65 655 
  
U.K. 2.189 399 56 5.019 2.856 0.463 0.147 0.104 -0.004 
26 116 46 9 67 4.475 Total 15,610 Total 15.656 2.860 71 69.552 50.816 5.436 0.098 0.111 0.006 
27 365 47 72 70 89 
    
        
Notes: SIC is the two-digit Standard Industry Classification code. Mean is the sample average for each of the variables. 
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